ONCENTRAT1ON measures indicate the extent to which some specific magnitude, such as total deposits, sales or capacity, is controlled by one or a few decision-making units in a market. At the firm level, which is the focus of this study, concentration depends on the number offirms in the market and their relative sizes. Accordingly, the fewer the banking organizations in a local commercial banking market or the more unevenly deposits are distributed among a given number of organizations within a market, the higher the concentration in that market. may be proposed to monitor or inodif~'market performance.
The concentration of total deposits among banking organizations in 176 Eighth District local commercial banking markets is described in this study.
3 Also described is the distribution of observed levels ofconcentration according to a recently published Department of Justice criterion for classifying markets as highly concentrated, moderately concentrated and unconcentrated. Finally, the effects on concentration due to
The degree of market concentration is important because it may affect the overall "performance" of the market -the extent to which firms in the market act independently, aggressively adopt new technologies, provide desired types and levels of services and carry out other activities that benefit buyers, suppliers and others. While the existence of a systematic link between concentration and performance is open to debate, there are many, including the U.S. Department of Justice, who believe that a high level of concentration in a market will affect the market's performance adversely.
2 Thus, if a market is characterized as being highly concentrated, sonic form of policy intervention
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'Concentration also can he measured at the plant level. 2 The Department of Justice, in its June 1982 merger guidelines, noted that: Other things being equal. concentration affects tlsc likelihood that one firm, or a snsall grot p of fi rnss, could successfully exercise market power. The smaller the percentage of total stipp 1 v that a finn controls. tlse more severely it ,ss sist restrict its own outpu tin order to prodi cc' a given price increase'. a,icI tlse lcss likely it is that an output restriction will he profitable. Where collective action is neeessarv, an additional constrast applies. As the nuinber of firnis necessary to control a given pereestage of total aupph-increases, cIsc dibEciilties and costs of reaching and eniorcing consensus with respect to the cssistrol tsf tlsat stipply also ilserease.
U.S. Department of Justice, "Merger Guidelines," federal Register (June 30, 1982) demand in local commercial banking markets, differences in state laws allowing branching and multibank holding companies, and physical space within local markets are considered.
The study is divided into three sections: First, definitions and the measure of concentration are introduced. Second, the concentration of total deposits among banking organizations in local comniercial banking markets is reported and analyzed.
4 A summary and conclusions are then presented.
THE 1HEASUREMENT OF CONCENTRATION

Concentration and the Definition of Relevant Commercial Banking Markets
Market boundaries separate sellers who compete directly from those with whom there is no direct competition. Consequently, the measure of concentration in a market depends in a critical way on the manner in which the boundaries of the market are defined. All else equal, the more narrowly defined the market, the higher the measured concentration for a specific number of firms.
The definition of a market's boundaries depends on two considerations: the products that are judged to be close substitutes and the geographic space over which the producers of those products compete for the same buyers." In this study, the product analyzed is com- The geographic boundaries of markets in this study are those established by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its analysis of bank holding company and hank merger applications. A frequent alternative to this approach is to define banking markets along county or_Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) lines. This alternative, however, is rejected under the assumption that market boundaries need not coincide with political boundaries. 8
fl.e Selection of a Concentration Measure
Once the relevant markets are defined, the concentration measure must be selected and its quantitative value obtained for each market.
Because concentration measures are based on the behavior of a single variable, such as capacity, value added or sales, the results and rankings obtained using one variable may differ from those obtained using another. This is especially a problem when dealing with commercial banks, which are multiproduct firms°F orexample, in a Board of Governors memo on the consideration of thrifts in competitive analysis, it was concluded that:
The present general framework of conspetitive analysis shosmld continue, with initial consideration always of cssmpetitive effects on the structure and performance of commercial banking alone, Supp. 793, [799] [800] [801] .N.J. 1980). 7 For a summary of alternative geographic market definitions in banking structore-performance studies, see Rhoades, Structure-Pemfornsance Studies, appendix table. 8 The distinction between the county/SMSA market defisaition and the definitions smsed in this study may be naore important isa principle than in effect. Of the 176 banking mam-kets examined, 99 (56.25 percent) coincide with single counties, 24 (13.64 percent) coincide with two or more whole counties, and 53(30.11 percemat) coincide with parts of individual counties, whole counties plus parts of other counties or Ranally Metropolitan Areas. and thus offer a wide range of variables as potential candidates for evaluation. This study focuses on total deposits in commercial banks because of its importance in Federal Reserve Board policy decisions that affect concentration in commercial banking markets.°T he concentration of total deposits in each local market is calculated using a Herfindahl index (Hindex), which is the sum of the squared market shares of the organizations in the market.'°Each banking organization's share ofa market is equal to the percentage of total deposits in the market that it controls.
The H-index is chosen over other concentration measures for three reasons. First, the recently published Department of Justice merger guidelines rely primarily on the H-index to measure concentration." Second, unlike other widely used concentration measures, the H-index is explicitly sensitive to the impact on concentration of the number of sellers in a market and their relative sizes,' 2 Third, H-index numbers translate conveniently into "numbers-equivalents," which are useful for making intermarket comparisons ofconcentration. The numbers-equivalent is the numher of equally sized sellers that would generate an H-index value equal to the observed value.' 3°S ee,for example, orders on bank holding company eases published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, n tI moHindex =~(-_±-!-)~,where td~is total deposits in the ith i=1 TD commercial banking organization in a market, TI) is total deposits in all commercial banking organizations in that market, and n is the number ofbanking orgassizations in that market, The H-index can assume a value of from 1/n through 1. As a market becomes more concentrated, either through a decrease in the nssmnber of sellers or a widening issequality among a given numl,er of sellers' market shares, the H-index number approaches 1. "U.S. Department of Justice. "Merger Guidelines," p. 28497. saTOP level concentration measssres (e.g.: three-firm, fommr-flrm or eight-firm concentration ratios and curves) focus primarily on the snarket shares ofthe largest firsus with passing, if any, cosasidem'ation ofsmaller sellers in a market. Lorenzcurves measure ineqssality in the distribution of mnarket shares, with no particular reference to the numnber of sellers in a mnarket, It shossld he noted that the greater semasitivity of the H-index does not necessarily make it superior to other measures ofconcentration. The appropriateness of any measure must be judged according to the theoretical relationship it is describing. t 3~r henumbers-equivalent is the reciprocal ofthe Hem'findahl issdex nsmtnher: 1/I-I-index.
ANALYSIS OF LOCAL MARKET CONCENTRATION
Summary of Conce-ntration i-n Local Commercial Banking 1.-larkets
On the basis of its H-index value, each kical commercial banking market in the Eighth District is placed into one of 15 concentration categories. These categories, along with their respective H-index value ranges and the numbers-equivalents indicating the least concentrated market consistent with placement in each category, are listed in table 1, Also listed in table 1 is the distribution of all 176 markets among H-index categories, the distribution among categories of markets in each state, and the distribution among categories of markets that cross state lines. For all markets taken together, the mode category is H4 (the equivalent offrom 3 to 2 equal-sized banking organizations in a market), and the median is in category H5 (the equivalent of from 4 to 3 equal-sized bankiug organizations in a market).
The extent ofconcentration in the observed banking markets can be further categorized according to the Department of Justice guidelines for evaluating horizontal mergers. Markets with H-index values less than 0.10 are considered to be "unconcentrated," markets with H-index values greater than 0.18 are considered to be "highly concentrated," and markets with H-index values between 0.10 and 0.18 are considered to he "moderately concentrated." 4 This categorization is listed in the right-hand column of table 1.
Generally, as illustrated in table 1, local commercial banking markets in the Eighth District are highly concentrated by the Department ofJustice criterion: over 80 percent of the markets studied fall into the highly concentrated group. Several factors that help explain why concentration is higher in some markets than in others are discussed below.
"The "unconcentrated, ""moderastely concentrated" and "highly concentrated" distinctions are based on post-merger H-index valises. The Department of Justice has indicated that it is ttnlikely to challenge mergers in markets where the post-merger H-index value is less than 0.10; unlikely to challenge mergers that increase the Fl-index value by less than 0.01 in mnarkets where the postmerger H-index value is between 0.10 and 0.18; and unlikely to challenge mergers that isserease the H-index value by less than 0.965 in snarkets where the post-merger I-I-index value is gm-eater than 0.18. The Department of Jsastice also has identified other factors that are of consequence in evaluatimag the effects oflaorizontal mergers. See U.S. Department of Justice, "Merger Guidelines," pp. 28496-99. 
What Factors Influence the Extent of Concent-ratio-n?
Concentration and Demand -One factor that can influence concentration is the level of demand in a anarket. All other things equal, lower demand would be expected to lead to fewer sellers and greater concentration in a market. Such a relationship can be explained on efficiency grounds. Operation below some specified level of output prevents a seller from fully exploiting the scale economnies that allow unit costs to fall as output increases. Such scale economies result, for example, from the utilization of specialized inputs, or efficiencies from consolidating previously separate activities. The level of output at which scale economies are exhausted (i.e., at which unit costs are minimized) is termed the "minimum efficient scale," and the number of sellers that can achieve that level of output is influenced by the size of the snarket as measured imi terms of demand: the greater the demand in a market, the greater the number of sellers achieving minimum efficient scale it can accommodate. As a result of this interaction between scale econosnies and desnand, there is an upper limit on the number of sellers which can operate at or above a minimum efficient level of output in a market.
In this study, total population in the market is used as a proxy for market demand: the greater the population, the greater tlse demand. " The distribution of Eighth District local commercial banking markets according to total population is shown in table 2.
To test for the effect of demand on concentration, a simple statistical procedure is used. One hypothesis, Kentucky, Part 26, Mississippi, Missouri, Part 38, Oklahoma, Tessnessee, It is necessary to estimate the populatiosas of markets tlaat include parts of counties. For these niarkets. it is assumed that population is distributed evenly across each relevant coumatv, so that the proportion of a county's physical space included isa a market is equal to the prtsportion oF that cousaty '5~O~O latioss isscluded in the market. tersned the. null ha pothesis states that H-imadex salues in tlae 88 sanallest (least populated) markets are essen tiallv the sasne on averact. as those for the 88 largest (most populated) markets The. alternative hpothesis is that H-indt.x alues an the 88 least popul<tted markt ts ar higher on ax rage, tlaan those for the 88 most populated markets. he cx-
Concentration, State Banking Laws and Market
Space -In any given market, a reorganization of sellers that reduces their number or increases the market share of one large firm generally increases the H-index value fhr that snarket. In commercial banking, the merging of two or anore previously competing banks into a snultibank holding company generally would increase concentration. Sisnilarly, an increase in the number of branches in a market by a large bank would increase concentration if it draws deposits away frona smaller banks. Thus, in principle, legislation allowing multibank holding companies or branching would he expected to increase coracentration.
On June 30, 1981, there were several different legislative environmnents within which Eightla District banking organizations operated. Illinois allowed neither branching nor snultibank holding companies;
TI_ic valise of tI_ic test statistic. usisag a os_ic-tailed test, is 34.57 for the 88 least popsalated vs. 88 most populated markets con_iparison. At tI_ic 0.1 percent level, ti_is exceeds the clai-sqoare statistic with tv,'o degrees of freedom of 13.82.
Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky and Mississippi allowed limited branching but not multibank holding companies; Missouri allowed multibank holding companies but not branching; and Tennessee allowed both limited branching and multibank holding companies. 5
To test for the effect of state banking laws on local market concentration, three market groupisags are evaluated using multiple regression analysis. In the first grouping, the H-index values for the 164 markets that do not cross state lines are regressed on market population, a multihank holding company dusnsnv variable and a branching dummy variable. In tI_ic second and third groupings, the H-index values for local markets are regressed on market population, the multihank holding company dummy variable, the branchirag dummy variable and a "square miles" variable, introduced to capture the effect on concesatration of physical space within a market. All else equal, it is expected that the greater the geographic size of a market, the larger the number of firms it can accommnodate, and the lower the concentration.
The space variable is n_ieasured in terms of square miles of county rather than square miles of market as defined by competitive relationships. Therefore, the second grouping is limited to the 120 Eighth District local commercial banking markets that do not cross state lines and that are made up of one or more whole counties. The third grouping is composed of598 single counties in the states encompassing the Eighth District, except Mississippi, for which there are inadequate data.Th Market areas within these states but outside the Eighth District are included ira tlais grouping. It is implied in the third grouping that, in all instances, the relevarat market is eqrsal to a single county. This grouping is introduced to test the effects of state banking laws, population and space on local market concentration using an alternative criterion for defining relevant markets. The regression equation for each grouping is calculated in its natural log form, and the results are presented in table 4. As illustrated, the explanatory variables have the expected signs. For each grouping, local market concentration increases with decreases in population and with the introduction of state banking laws allowing multihank holding companies and limited branching. In tile second and third groupings, where size of county is introduced, concentration increases as the space withira the relevantly defined markets decreases.
Unfortunately, there is some variation ira the statistical significance attached to these variables in explaining levels of local market concentration. Population avithin the relevantly defined market area is a significant explanatory variable irrespective of the market grouping chosen. This supports the conclusion of the nonparametric test of population and concentration presented in the preceding section.
The presence or absence of state branching laws also is significant in explaining local n_iarket concentration using each market grouping. Its statistical significance declines somewhat, however, when applied to the 120 Eighth District markets that cover one or more whole counties, compared with its impact in the other two groupings.
The performance ofthe size of county and multihank holding company variables is mixed. Size of county is significant fir the 598 county markets grouping, hut not for the 120 Eighth District markets covering one or more whole counties. Likewise, while multihank laolding con_ipany laws are statistically significant in explaining concentration where markets are defined to he single counties, they lose their explanatory power when applied to the two groupings derived from tlae Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis market definitions.
Tlaus, the results of the evaluations suggest that branching laws tend to significantly increase local market concentration. The impact of multihank holding company laws is unclear; its significance depends upon how the market is defined.
The results in table 4 indicate the problems iraherent in determining useful definitioras of banking markets. While the explanatory variables perform best when tlae markets are defined alorag single county lines, the categorical definition of a county as a market is conceptually empty. It takes no account of the actual state of interseller rivalry; yet, the notion of interseller rivalry represents the underlying reason for sneasuring market concentration in the first place. industries for merger activita -K'~This, coupled xs ith th extent to wl_iich local banking markets fall snto ti_ic "highly conceratrated" categor~suggests that future harak snergers and acquisitions may well he likel\ candidates for closer scrutiny hx the Department o Justice. If this hecon_ies tht case, it will tirades score. ti_id need for a clearer undc a tanding of the impact os_i measured concentration in a snarket of statc branchiraf arad snultihank holding comp-ina laws, popul-ition and playsical space and alternatix e crateria for defining thai market.
'°JohnMorris, "Banking Had More Mergers to '82 tlaan Any Othei
Group," American Banker, Januara' 19, 1983, p. 2.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
TI_ic majority of Eighth District local commercial banking markets are highly concentrated, as the term is defined by the Department ofjustice. Also, relatively higher levels of concentration c--an he expected in local markets with smaller populations of users, and located in states that allow limited branching. The effects on concentration of state multibank l_iolding compaaay laws and tlae pl_iysical size of a snarket, however, are asnl_iiguorss. in 1982, banking as_id finance ranked first among 50
